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Health care rationing has always been seen as a wicked problem, somehow special and not subject to the same
rules of engagement as other policy areas. The article by Philip Sax makes a strong contribution by placing one
prominent part of rationing, determination of a national drug formulary, into the larger political economy context
of Israeli policy making. While one can argue with some of Sax’s implied conclusions, his analysis provides a great
platform not only to understand governance of this difficult area, but also to better govern in the future.Health care rationing is one of the least comfortable
topics to address, especially for politicians charged with
making health resource allocation decisions, but also for
health policy analysts. Nobody wants to “play God.” This
reticence was captured in the breakthrough book, The
Painful Prescription by Aaron and Schwartz from 1986
[1]. That volume described how rationing of health care in
both the US and the UK was done implicitly, in the US by
lack of access to health insurance, and in the UK by subtle
denial of services such as renal dialysis to patients over 65.
That book, as well as Tragic Choices by Guido Calabresi
[2], were among those that opened a more explicit discus-
sion about rationing in health systems.
Beginning in the mid 1990s, the literature on rationing
grew and the International Society for Priority Setting in
Health Care began to meet every two years to discuss the
issue [3]. The main lines of discussion turned on sub-
stance and process. Regarding the first, economists and
ethicists (though not often in concert) led the way, seeking
rules for rationing. Some of the credos that emerged
included:
 Benefit cost ratios should be maximized
 Benefits can be defined in terms of quality adjusted
life years
 Public preferences for health services can be
measured and used to inform rationing
 Health resources should be allocated so as to
equalize opportunity across members of societyCorrespondence: chinitz@cc.huji.ac.il
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unless otherwise stated.On the process side, the leading figure was perhaps
Rudolph Klein [4], who appealed repeatedly to economists
and technocrats to focus on the design of legitimate,
accountable, public institutions charged with making ra-
tioning decisions. Norman Daniels [5] developed what is
probably the most stable paradigm for health care priority
setting: Accountability for Reasonableness, which empha-
sized that decision making processes should be transpar-
ent and reasonable, regardless of the substantive outcomes
they produce.
Because of the sensitive nature of health care rationing,
these twin strands of analysis stood apart from larger pol-
itical contexts. Comparisons between countries regarding
rationing often turned on matters of culture. Analysts
would occasionally quip that policy mechanisms routinely
deal with life and death decisions, such as in investment
in traffic safety, but the mechanisms of governance that
seemed to apply to most areas of social policy, even those
with health implications, somehow were left tangential to
discussions of health care rationing.
However, as a number of countries have taken differ-
ent paths to making health care priority setting more
explicit, the linkages to the overall machinery of policy
making have become more apparent. In other words,
health care rationing can now be addressed as a “regular”
policy issue, subject to the same theories regarding inter-
est groups, public choice, regulatory behavior and political
leadership that are considered salient in any policy area.
The paper by Sax [6] on which this commentary is
based, provides an excellent example. Almost without
batting an eyelash, the author seeks to explain health
care rationing, in particular regarding pharmaceuticals,his is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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governance. Using the Israeli case, Sax nicely demon-
strates how the politics of access to drugs may be mor-
ally and ethically charged (see under “death panels”) but
remain politics nonetheless.
Sax uses political theory in an effective way to trace
the evolution of governance of pharmaceutical policy.
He identifies correctly, in the view of this author, three
stages of development. The first stage consists of the in-
choate market for drugs that existed prior to enactment
of National Health Insurance (NHI) in Israel in 1995.
During this first period, policy and decision making at
various levels in the health system regarding pharmaceu-
ticals emphasized safety and pricing. The situation in
Israel was one of large purchasers, the four major health
maintenance organizations (HMO) and the government,
who purchased and allocated drugs in bulk. Most of the
action in the pharmaceutical sector was around verifying
the safety of drugs, based on approval in other countries
by agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in the US, and on pricing. This parallels the situ-
ation in other countries, such as the US, the Netherlands
and Germany, in which health technology assessment
(HTA) was only beginning to be deployed regarding med-
ical interventions, and mechanisms such as reference
pricing were just beginning to be mandated by publicly fi-
nanced health insurance programs [7].
The second stage, ensuing with the implementation of
NHI, moved the system from a market with large
players, to a more hierarchical situation in which gov-
ernment established a national formulary that obligated
the four HMOs. Born out of the fundamental pillars of
the law, the formulary – arguably the most visible part
of the standard basket of health services mandated by
the law – combined the desire for financial viability and
accountability with legal responsibility to provide a clear
set of benefits. Whereas before NHI, HMOs had wide
latitude in determining what drugs would be available,
after the passage of NHI access to pharmaceuticals was
determined on a national basis. As Sax points out, partly
due to public pressure, a multi-sector Committee to Up-
date the Basket of Health Services was created in 1998
and has become the institutional manifestation of the
hierarchical governance introduced in the pharmaceut-
ical sector. Sax compares the Israeli situation to the role
of the Pharmaceutical Management Committee (PHAR-
MAC) in New Zealand, hinting at preference for the lat-
ter because of its harder bargain driving vis a vis drug
companies. Be that as it may, Israel is a social insurance
based system, while New Zealand is a Beveridge system
and therefore less pluralistic in its overall governance of
health care. Given that, the degree of hierarchy charac-
terizing governance of the Israeli pharmaceutical sector
is impressive.Sax’s third stage brings to bear network theory, which
describes and explains the web of stakeholder relation-
ships that inevitably emerge within hierarchical govern-
ance. Pharmaceutical companies, regulators, HMOs, and
physicians interact within the official process of updating
the basket of services, each trying to advance their own
agenda. Sax labels this a kind of “neo corporatist” arrange-
ment, in which interest groups interact under government
auspices to determine policy outcomes. The implication in
the article is that the web of interacting stakeholders is as-
sociated with lack of participation of the broader public in
the priority setting process, and lack of transparency as to
how decisions are being made. In particular, Sax concerns
himself with the degree to which allocation decisions
made by government, represented by the Committee to
Update the Basic Basket, are implemented by the HMOs.
There are several problems with this last part of the
analysis. First of all, corporatism implies that the stake-
holders at the table and in the game represent a broad
array of the key interested parties, including the general
public. It should be remembered that citizens’ rights
groups, as well as disease oriented interest groups exert le-
verage on the Committee, meaning that there is public in-
put. Second, Sax seems to imply that pharmaceutical
companies have an inside track in the decision making
process. However, it should be remembered that on aver-
age, only about 70 of 600 candidates to be included in the
basket of health services are ultimately inducted. This sug-
gests that even if pharmaceutical companies are equipped
to exert undue influence, there are winners and losers
among the pharmaceutical companies themselves, in ef-
fect not only cancelling out the strength of these special
interests, but making them dependent on the members of
the Committee and the degree of public support for their
favored candidates for coverage. Finally, while it is true
that the strategy of HMOs in influencing the decisions of
the Committee and how they allocate additional funds are
not transparent, the funds are used for health services one
way or the other which means that “rents” in the form of
over budgeting of specific drugs are not a dead weight
welfare loss to the health system.. From a transaction cost
point of view, the costs and benefits of increased transpar-
ency need to be weighed. One possible conclusion is that
the process of admitting new drugs into the basket serves
to make tough decisions in allocating the increment of
funds made available each year by the government, but be-
yond this it is efficient to leave the actual allocations to
the HMOs.
Sax argues that the process has emphasized medical
services, to the exclusion of health promotion, preven-
tion and population health targeted services. It could be
argued, however, that the increasing “education” of the
public to the need for priority setting, even in health
care, which Sax himself references, provides a basis on
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health in the future. Indeed, certain treatments, such as
behavioral smoking cessation programs, have been given
priority by the Committee and included in the basket.
The invaluable contribution of this paper is placing
health care priority setting in a broader political theor-
etic framework. The transition that took place in Israel
is well captured by the market to hierarchy to network
evolution put forward in the paper. The paper creates a
platform for identifying the current challenges facing
Israeli pharmaceutical governance, including the degree
to which more transparency is needed and the problem
of “medicalization” at the expense of public health. The
governance musculature developed in Israel in the tough
area of health resource allocation provides an interesting
paradigm for other health systems, just as it can be the
basis for further positive incremental change.
Commentary on The shaping of pharmaceutical gov-
ernance: the Israeli case
By Philip Sax 2014, 3:16
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